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Federal Parole Decisionmaking:
Judicial Review for the Fortunate
and Few
I. Introduction

Sixty percent of all prisoners, state and federal, are paroled
before their sentences expire.' All federal prisoners sentenced since
adoption of the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 19762
eventually become eligible3 for meaningful parole consideration by
the United States Parole Commission. Pursuant to the Act, 4 the
Commission has promulgated guidelines to facilitate its decisionmaking procedures.' These guidelines are intended to provide structure within which discretion may be exercised in parole
decisionmaking, and to maintain sufficient flexibility to promote individual consideration of each prisoner.6 Although the Commission
retains a substantial degree of discretion in formulating its guidelines, 7 they must conform to the criteria established by Congress.'
I. A minimum of sixty percent of state and federal prisoners are paroled before their
sentences expire. Two-thirds of those serving felony sentences are "at large in the community
on parole." Cole and Talarico, Second Thoughts on Parole' 63 A.B.A.J. 972, 973 (1977). When
viewed with regard to current rates of recidivism, these figures become very significant. See
Hoffman and Meierhoefer, Post Release Arrest Experiences of Federal Prisoners: A Six Year
Follow-Up, 7 J. CRIM. JUST. 193 (1979).

2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976). This legislation will be referred to as the "Act" or the
"PCRA" in subsequent text and notes.
3. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976), a sentencing judge has three options. First, under
subsection (a), the judge may impose a straight sentence, setting parole eligibility for the prisoner at the one-third point of his sentence. Second, under subsection (b)(l), the judge may
elect to impose a minimum sentence, less than the one-third point, after which the prisoner
becomes eligible for parole. Last, under subsection (b)(2), the judge may give the prisoner a
maximum sentence with immediate parole eligibility.
4. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(1) (1976), the Parole Commission is required to "promulgate rules and regulations establishing guidelines for the powers enumerated [in the PCRA]."
5. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1980).
6. In setting forth its policy objectives, the Commission declared that in order to "establish a national paroling policy, promote a more consistent exercise of discretion, and enable
fairer and more equitable decisionmaking without removing individual case consideration, the
United States Parole Commission has adopted guidelines for parole release consideration." 28
C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1980).
7. Because of the great independence of the Commission, "[plarole granting remains the
most autocratic, least regulated phase of correction." Rubin, New Sentencing Proposals and
Laws in the 1970s, 43 FEB. PROB. 3, 6 (1979). See Project, Parole Release Decisionmnaking and
the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 889 (1975).

8. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1976). The Commission must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as the history and characteristics of the offender. The Commission is also required to consider whether parole would depreciate the seriousness of the offense

The guidelines adopted thus far are laudible in that they tend to
promote uniformity in federal parole decisionmaking. 9 The present
statutory system, however, does not provide for adequate participation by the courts in the federal parole decisionmaking process. As a
result, individual consideration of prospective parolees is sacrificed

to the Commission's avowed policy of achieving uniformity in its
decisions.'1
II.

Current Status of the Federal Parole System

A.

GeneralPurpose of Parole

Parole is release from confinement prior to the expiration of the
prisoner's sentence." It is a method of selectively releasing
prison3
ers, 12 applying both subjective and objective criteria.'
Parole has two principal purposes: First, parole vindicates the
needs of society by discontinuing needless imprisonment and protecting society from potential recidivists by denying them parole.
Second, it is a method of providing continuing treatment and supervision of the offender while he readjusts to society.' 4
Release on parole is a privilege; it is not a reward for rehabilitation,' 5 nor does any prisoner have an enforceable right to release on
or promote disrespect for the law, and whether there is potential danger to society if the prisoner is released.
9. Flaxman, The Hidden Dangers of Sentencing Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 259, 260
(1979). See Project, supra note 7, at 872.
10. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 553 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1977); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole, 409 F. Supp.
1230 (D. Kan. 1976).
11. DeCosta v. United States Dist. Court, 445 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D. Minn. 1978).
12.

NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE ASSOCIATION, PAROLE IN PRINCIPLE AND PRAC-

TICE: A MANUAL AND REPORT 65 (M. Bell ed. 1957).
13. The guidelines attempt to establish objective criteria to that which is essentially subjective in the decisionmaking process. The concept of "offense severity," for example, is relative. It depends upon comparison to other offenses. It's objective system of classification
requires that the offenses being compared are similar. The hearing examiners' subjective interpretation of the objective facts before them imposes a certain degree of subjectivity into the
parole decisionmaking process.
14. NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, supra note 12, at 66. See D.
DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE (1959). Although these are

the goals of parole most often articulated, other goals have been recognized:
(i) finding the optimum moment for release;
(2) providing an incentive for rehabilitation;
(3) facilitating prison control and discipline;
(4) sharing responsibility for sentencing to maximize deterrence;
(5) providing a release value for prison overcrowding; and
(6) rectifying unwarranted sentencing disparities.
Morris, Sentencing and Parole, 51 AUST. L.J. 523, 524 (1977).
The present parole system is predicated upon the belief that the parole decision can accurately predict the probability of future criminality of the prospective parolee. Although parole
serves important functions in a system of indeterminate sentencing, adherence to the historical
objectives of parole is ill-advised. See Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of
Prison Terms- Equity, Determinancy, andthe ParoleRelease Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89,
91 (1979). See note 18 and accompanying text infra
15. See also note 14 and accompanying text supra.

parole. 16 How the Commission converts the right to be considered
for parole' 7 into a denial of parole or a decision to grant parole is
determined by the guidelines. If parole is to be a continuing part of
the criminal justice system,' 8 the guidelines must be carefully scrutinized.
B. Implementation and Purposesof the FederalParole Guidelines
L History of the Guidelines.-In 1910, Congress first authorized the parole of federal prisoners.' 9 Not until 1973, after sixtythree years of relatively unguided decisionmaking,2 ° did the federal
parole authority publish a series of regulations governing parole
decisionmaking. 2 !
In 1976, the Board of Parole was replaced by the Parole Commission.2 2 Under the direction of the United States Board of Parole,23 an experiment with the use of guidelines for parole
decisionmaking was conducted at five northeastern federal institutions. 24 The use of guidelines to structure the exercise of discretion
was found to be helpful in addressing the problems in the federal
parole system. In apparent approval of the system developed by the
Parole Board, Congress passed the PCRA in 1976, requiring the
Commission to promulgate guidelines.2 5
16. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979).
17. See note 3 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Wigoda, 417 F.
Supp. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
18. Many commentators, in fact, argue for the abolition of parole and indeterminate
sentencing. See, e.g., Morris, 51 AUST. L.J. 523, supra note 14; Cole & Talarico, supra note 1;
Skrivseth, Abolishing Parole. Assuring Fairness and Certainty in Sentencing, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 281 (1979).

19. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819.
20. The parole authority did not officially publish its policies and methods until 1973.
There was little guidance from Congress. See Flaxman, supra note 9, at 264-65. The Parole
Board did articulate its policies, but unofficially in journals. See, e.g., Chappell, FederalParole
Policies and Practices, 26 FED. PROB. 27 (June 1962); Richardson, Policiesand Practicesof the
United States Board of Parole, 19 FED. PROB. 14 (Dec. 1955). Both of these articles were
published by the current Chairmen of the Board of Parole. This piecemeal and informal
method of publication was part of the problem that culminated in the promulgation of the
guidelines. See Flaxman, supra note 9, at 265.
21. 38 Fed. Reg. 26,652 (1973).
22. The United States Parole Commission was created under § 4202 of the PCRA to
replace the United States Board of Parole.
23. The United States Board of Parole will hereinafter be referred to as "the Board." See
note 21 supra.
24. M. GOTTFREDSON, P. HOFFMAN & L. WILKINS, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 18-37 (1978).
25. The sudden congressional concern with parole policy was, perhaps, attributable to
increased social awareness of prisoner's grievances with parole policy. There was a general
intolerance for perceived injustice in the early 1970's, and this may have engendered at least
transitory congressional interest in parole policy. N. HARLOW, E. NELSON, H. OHMART,
PROMISING STRATEGIES IN PROBATION AND PAROLE 1-3 (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Dept. of Just., Nov. 1978).

2 Goal of Consistency.-In theory, the guidelines control the
exercise of the Commission's discretion. The guidelines are intended
to increase consistency in parole decisionmaking and yet retain a significant capacity for individual consideration.26 These two objectives, however, are inherently inconsistent.27
The overall uniformity sought by the Commission involves a
consistency in policy determination and practical application. Consistency in the criteria considered, and weight given each element, is
clearly appropriate. But if the Commission seeks consistency in actual results, its efforts are misguided. Arriving at consistent results in
dissimilar cases is patently unjust.2 8 Such an objective lessens the
overall effectiveness of the entire federal criminal justice system.29
C

Operation of the Guidelines

The guidelines are complex both in structure and operation.3"
To determine the total number of months, or "customary term" the
inmate must serve before he will be paroled,3 two variables based
26.

UNITED

STATES

PAROLE COMMISSION

RESEARCH UNIT, THE SALIENT

FACTOR

SCORE - A NON-TECHNICAL OVERVIEW (Report 22, Sept. 1979). See note 6 and accompany-

ing text supra.
27. If the meanings attached to "consistency" and "individual consideration" are those of
general usage, an essential inconsistency arises. Unless all cases of a certain class involve very
similar offenses and very similar offenders, any "consistent" treatment of the cases necessarily
neutralizes any "individual" circumstances. No two offenders are exactly alike and no two
offenses were committed under the same circumstances. See note 57 and accompanying text
infra. Proponents of the guidelines system believe the system has adequately reconciled this
inconsistency. See Gottfredson, Parole Board Decision Making: 4 Study of the Disparity Reduction and the Impact ofInstitutionalBehavior, 70 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 77 (1979); Gottfredson, Parole Guidelines and the Reduction of Sentencing Disparity, 16 J.OF RESEARCH IN
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 218 (1978). Opponents, however, believe reconcilation impossible.

See Flaxman, supra note 9 and Project, supra note 7.
28. As an illustration: both X and Y are 25 years of age. Both are employed full time.
Both were convicted of nearly identical armed robberies less than two years ago. Neither has
had a previous coviction. But X found it necessary to obtain large sums of money to pay for
his four year old daughter's chemotherapy. Y wanted money to buy a substantial amount of
cocaine to sell at a profit. X is sentenced under § 4206(b)(2) to five years (immediate parole
eligibility). Y' is sentenced under § 4205(b)(1) to four to fifteen years by the same judge. The
current guidelines system has no capacity to automatically distinguish between X and Y. The
Commission could release X before Y (see note 59 and accompanying text infra) but need not
do so. If X and Y are treated the same way, the results are consistent, but they do not reflect
individual differences surrounding the commission of the crimes.
29. If the goal of parole were to achieve consistent results, the best method to achieve this
goal would be to deny parole to each and every eligible prisoner. But since some prisoners
must be paroled, the decision to deny or grant release must not treat individuals without regard to their individuality. Apples and oranges may be compared but never without regard to
their intrinsic differences. The Commission is charged with the unenviable task of neutralizing
individual differences in effect and yet paying attention to these differences in theory.
30. Cecil B. McCall, present Chairman of the Commission, recently stated: "As for the
complexity of the guidelines, I can only testify from my own experience that the Parole Commission's guidelines are complex enough to give rise to continual questions of interpretation."
McCall, The Future of Pardle - In Rebuttal ofS.1437 [proposal of federal sentencing guidelines], 42 FED. PROB. 3, 5 (1978).

31. A threshold requirement for parole.under the guidelines is substantial observance of
the rules attendant upon the inmates's confinement. The customary term of imprisonment
may be disregarded if such observance is not demonstrated. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976).

on characteristics of the prisoner are considered. First, the inmate's
projected predeliction for future criminality is determined by a "salient factor score."' 32 Second, the nature of the inmate's crime is characterized by reference to an "offense severity rating."3 3 For each
possible combination of an offender's salient factor score, and his
offense severity rating, the guidelines yield a particular customary
range of time to be served prior to parole consideration. 4
1. The Salient FactorScore. -The salient factor score utilizes
seven items that, when added together, provide a score ranging from
zero to eleven. In theory, the higher the score is, the lower the
probability of recidivism will be.3" Of the seven items, five center
upon previous criminality, one considers history of opiate dependence, and one considers recent employment or school attendance.3 6
The Commission assigns a certain number of points for each item
depending upon the inmate's history and characteristics. For example, if the inmate has had no prior convictions, the Commission assigns three points for Item A. If he has had one prior conviction, the
Commission adds only two points. If he has had two or three prior
convictions, he still gets one point. If, however, he has had four or
more, he gets no points. The total number of points attained through
37
this system of classification is the inmate's salient factor score.
32. The essential purpose of this determination is to predict the potential success of the
inmate on parole. There is, however, considerable evidence that this cannot be done. N.
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 34-36 (1974); Project, supra note 7, at 822-26. For
an in-depth description of the salient factor score, see M. GOTTFREDSON, P. HOFFMAN & L.
WILKINS, supra note 24; UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT, supra note
26; UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT, REVALIDATING THE SALIENT
FACTOR SCORE; A RESEARCH NOTE (Report 21, Aug. 1979).

33. 28 C.F.R. § 2.21 (1980). The "'offense severity rating" is discussed at notes 38-41 and
accompanying text infra.
34. The "chart" according to which these factors are analyzed is reproduced in Appendix
II.
35. UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION RESEARCH UNIT, supra note 26 at I. This
theory is also denoted at 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(e) (1980).
36. See Appendix 1.

37.

Returning to the X-Y example set forth at note 28, the salient factor score in both

cases would be identical:

A: No prior convictions
B: No prior commitments
C: Age at first offense
D: Offense did not involve
checks or auto theft
Item E: Not a parole or probation
violator
Item F: No history of opiate
Item
Item
Item
Item

dependence

Item G:

=
=
=

3
2
I

=

I

=

I

=

I

=
=

I
10

Verified employment (or full time school attendance)
of 6 months during the last 2 years
Salient Factor

2 The Offense Severity Rating.-The Commission must then
rate the severity of the inmate's offense.38 The scale used is the "Offense Severity Rating," which categorizes all major types of crimes
into six groupings.39 These groupings represent the Commission's
decisions regarding which types of offenses should be treated similarly.40 Aggravating circumstances increase the severity of the rating. For example, mere gambling law violations are rated as "low."
If the Commission finds, however, that this violation involved a
"managerial or proprietary interest in small scale operation," the offense is then rated as a "low moderate" offense. 4 ' If this managerial
or proprietary interest was in what the Commission defines as a "medium scale operation," it is rated as "moderate" offense.4 2 If a large
scale operation was involved, it is rated a "high" severity offense.4 3
The list of crimes, though by no means exhaustive, 44 reflects a comprehensive list of federal crimes.
At the initial parole hearing the examiners discuss the inmate's
salient factor score and offense severity rating. 45 The offense is lo38. Offenses are rated by the Commission independently of legislative or judicial suggestions. No assurance exists that the Commission's views represent the community's notions of
just punishment. The comparative reprehensibility of crimes is better left to the legislature,
which represents public sentiments, and the judiciary, which has the necessary skills to compare and distinguish activities in light of pertinent statutory definitions. Project, supra note 7,
at 895.
39. The six groups are: Low, Low-Moderate, Moderate, High, Very High and Greatest (1
& II). The crimes are distinguished by type as well as by degree. See Appendix II.
40. See note 38 supra.
41. See Appendix II. The Commission is not limited to consider only the offense for
which the inmate was convicted. Very often plea bargaining will dilute the apparent severity
of the offense. The Commission may consider offenses dismissed, even if dismissed "with
prejudice." Bistram v. United States Bd. of Parole, 535 F.2d 329, 330 (5th Cir. 1976); Narvaiz
v. Day, 444 F. Supp. 36, 37 (W.D. Okla. 1977). Contra, Pernetti v. United States, 21 Crim. L.
Rep. 2033 (D.N.J. 1977) (Parole Board may not consider charges dismissed as part of plea
bargain).
If the Commission is to properly rate the severity of the offense and to attempt to project
from potential recidivism, informed decisions are necessary. If an inmate was actually guilty of
armed robbery and discharged a weapon, the Commission clearly should have access to this
information even if the inmate bargained for a lesser charge. If the inmate has a criminal
record, the Commission would need to know of any increased danger to society as reflected by
progressing from breaking and entering to armed robbery. On the other hand, the inmate has
waived his right to a trial by jury by entering a guilty plea. The bargain created in the inmate
an expectation that the law would treat him guilty of the lesser offense. If the Commission
disregards this bargain, the inmate might become bitter and disrespectful for the entire system.
The Commission has access to a wide variety of information. In Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Supreme Court held that in considering information for purposes of
sentencing, the Constitution does not restrict the type of evidence or information upon which
the judge may rely. Other courts have extended this authorization to the parole authority. See,
e.g., Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) (parole revocation based on charges of
which inmate was acquitted); Manos v. Board of Parole, 399 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Pa. 1975)
(no constitutional violation when alleged offense considered in parole determinations).
42. See Appendix II.
43. Id
44. The crimes included in each category are intended to be "examples" of the type of
crime to receive that rating. Any crime not listed should be compared to analogous behavior.
28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1980).
45. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1980).

cated on the offense severity scale and the salient factor category is
juxtaposed. For example, under the "high" category of offense severity, with a salient factor score of ten ("very good") the guidelines
indicate 14-20 months of incarceration before parole release is warranted. 46 The examiners will usually establish a "presumptive release date" within the range.
3. Factors not Considered-On their face, the guidelines simply disregard two notable factors. First, nowhere do the guidelines
mention or allude to the actual sentence imposed by the sentencing
judge. Neither the salient factor score nor the offense severity rating
considers the sentence, and the Commission seems to disregard it
totally. 7 Yet Congress, under the PCRA, required the Commission
to consider "recommendations regarding the prisoner's parole made
at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge" if "available and
relevant. ' 48 Also, the guidelines do not provide for consideration of
the recommendations of the staff of the prison for parole of the inmate. Although good behavior is obviously a prerequisite for parole,
a number of cases demonstrate the Commission's capacity for disregarding exemplary behavior and institutional recommendations.4 9
C. Effect on Uniformity and Individual Consideration
Undoubtedly the most important function of the guidelines is to
increase overall uniformity and consistency in parole release decisionmaking ° Accordingly, Congress intended that there should be
consistency in parole policy throughout the nation." This would
purportedly discourage instances of racial discrimination in designated areas, 52 preference for or against white collar criminals in par46. Applying this system to the X-Y example in notes 28 and 37 supra, the customary
length of imprisonment is from 24 to 36 months. See Appendix II.
47. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Parole Release Guidelines, 51 U. COLO. L. REV.
237, 238 (1980). See, e.g., Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980) (remanded to district court for recertification of class);
United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1978); Banks v. United States, 553 F.2d 37
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Snooks, No. 79-00109-01-C-RW-1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980);
Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 4207(4) (1976). The Commission has officially incorporated this requirement into its policy, 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(4) (1980).
49. See, e.g., Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Snooks,
No. 79-00109-01-CR-W-I (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980); Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole,
409 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan, 1976).
50. See JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, S. REP. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-19,
reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE & AD. NEws 335-341; 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1980).
51. Congress required the Commission to establish at least five regions across the country, which the Commission has done. 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a)(2) (1976). The full Commission
(nine members) must meet quarterly to promulgate rules and regulations and establish a national policy.
52. The northeastern region might, for example, systematically deny parole release to
Puerto Rican inmates and grant release to others similarly situated. Ideally, appeals to the

ticular regions,5 3 and regional biases in general." Although the
policy of overall uniformity should involve consistency in practical
application of the guidelines, this is not to say that application of the
guidelines should achieve absolutely consistent, or uniform, results."
The developers of the guidelines noted that "merely ensuring equity
does not necessarily ensure justice, because it would be possible to
conclude that while similar persons were treated equally, they were
all treated unjustly."5 6
In seeking to apply its guidelines in a consistent manner, the
Commission must also strive to individuate among prisoners. This is
the essential inconsistency that the Commission must reconcile. 7
The Commission's system does not readily accommodate mitigating
circumstances, and in some cases, parole decisions continue to be
made arbitrarily and capriciously. A recent case demonstrates how
the rigidity of the guidelines can operate to work injustice in order to
promote "consistency."58 In this case, a twenty-four year old drug
addict was convicted for a number of armed robberies. The district
judge determined that justice required a relatively short period of
incarceration accompanied by a drug treatment program. The judge
was informed that the defendant would serve 20-27 months under
the guidelines and would receive drug treatment rehabilitation. The
Commission deferred his treatment and extended his range of imprisonment to a minimum of forty months. The court held,
To begin with, the parole guidelines are arbitrary and indiscriminate. In this instance the guideline time was doubled because of
the number, rather than the nature, of the bank robberies involved. After examining all of the relevant information and factors, however, this Court concluded that the robberies should be
National Appeals Board would uncover this sort of regional discrimination. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.26(a) (1980).
53. Otherwise, hearing examiners could be predisposed toward unwarranted leniency or
severity with white collar criminals. Acquiescence to these practices by the Regional Commissioner could establish a regional policy in this particular regard. No cases seem to indicate the
occurrence of such practices, and thus, regional inconsistencies in this regard may be either
undetected or non-existent.
54. As described at note 53 supra, a region could develop a policy different from that of
another region merely by incorporating hearing examiners' practices into current policy.
Given the amount of unfettered discretion enjoyed by the Commission, regional variations are
an inherent danger. The National Appeals Board and the quarterly meetings on a national
basis serve to bring these inconsistencies to light. Contra, Flaxman, supra note 9, at 271.
55. See notes 28, 29 and accompanying text supra.
56. M. GOTrFREDSON, P. HOFFMAN, L. WILKINS, supra note 24, at 5.
57. See note 27 and accompanying text supra. The developers of the guidelines summarized the problem in the following manner:
One of the most troublesome issues in the administration of criminal justice involves
the exercise of discretionary power. On one hand, the unguided and unfettered exercise of discretion can lead to arbitrary and capricious decision making, decision inequity, and disparity. Such has been a major criticism of sentencing and parole
practices. On the other hand, the rigid application of fixed and mechanical rules
(mandatory sentences) can lead to results as undesirable and unjust.
M. GOTTFREDSON, P. HOFFMAN & L. WILKINS, supra note 24, at 22.
58. Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

viewed as a chain of related events. All 12 of the robberies occurred within the space of a few months and towards the end were
occurring on an almost daily basis, motivated by the petitioner's
insatiable need to satisfy his narcotics addiction. In a situation
such as this it is apparent to this Court that to equate all bank
robberies, much less all bank robbers, and to simply proceed on
the basis of the number of crimes involved, is an irrational approach. This defendant's short lived career as a bank robber
should have been viewed as a single event, and should have been
treated as such for sentencing purposes. 59

The arbitrariness of the system lies in its treatment of all members of a certain class in an identical fashion. Though this may enhance consistent parole decisionmaking, it ignores individual
differences among prisoners that should not be disregarded. Not all
inmates guilty of robbery for example, necessarily deserve the consequences attached to a "very high" offense severity rating. One district judge poignantly noted that "[individual parole consideration
of each case within the time frame fixed by the sentencing judge is
gone, replaced by the guidelines and their relatively rigid application.

"160

59. Id at 43. See also Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1978); Reyes-Aquirre v. Elsea, No. 78
C-3283 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1980).
Under § 4206(c) (1976) of the PCRA, incorporated into the guidelines at 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.20(c) (1980), the Commission may decide to grant or deny parole irrespective of the guidelines range. This appears to sufficiently provide for flexibility in an essentially rigid system.
The provision, however, is of illusory value as a remedy and fails to achieve its articulated
purpose. First, in order to reach a decision outside the guidelines range, the examiners or
Commissioners must find "good cause." Just what this means is not presently ascertainable.
In Banks v. United States, 553 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1978) and Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F.
Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the sentencing judges' deliberate attempts to demonstrate good reasons for leniency were not "good cause." In Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1979)
the court noted that "excellent" institutional behavior and recommendations by prison staff
that parole would be advisable were not "good cause." United States v. Sinkfield, 484 F.
Supp. 595 (N.D. Ga. 1980), the court noted its disagreement with the Commission's refusal to
find "good cause" where the probability of rehabilitation was very great. Likewise, in Garcia
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 409 F. Supp. 1230 (N.D. I1. 1976), the Commission did not find
"good cause" when the inmate had a salient factor score of I I and was recommended by the
institution for parole.
Second, the Commission is not obligated to find "good cause." The Commission has the
ultimate discretion in release decisions under the PCRA. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S.
178 (1979). Regardless of the most convincing reasons imaginable to grant release or detain a
prisoner outside the guidelines range, the Commission can not be coerced to find "good cause"
to deviate from the guidelines.
Finally, the provision to decide outside the guidelines is not nearly the panacea the Commission claims it is, because "lain effort is made to minimize the number of cases finding good
cause to depart from the guidelines. In fiscal year 1977, only 6.6% of all parole release decisions were below the guidelines, while 13.5% were above." Flaxman, supra note 9, at 268
[citations omitted]. The question arises, then, how much deviation from the guidelines is desirable? If in only 40% of the cases to which the guidelinesapply, see notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra, the decisions are within the guidelines, questions of inconsistent application
arise. If, on the other hand, 99% of all decisions are within the range, mechanistic treatment is
implied. A percentage falling somewhere between these two extremes seems warranted.
60. Garcia v. United States Bd. of Parole, 409 F. Supp. 1230, 1239 (N.D. 111.1976).
The system is rigid because the two determinants (salient factor score and offense severity
rating) are rigid measures. The problem with the salient factor score is that "its dictate is
constant, regardless of whether a prisoner has been confined for one day or twenty years."

Although the guidelines may achieve consistent results in the
usual case, 6 they do not apply to a large percentage of federal prisoners: approximately one-half of all federal prisoners are not eligible for parole at the time recommended by the guidelines.6 2 Half of
these federal prisoners have maximum sentences shorter than the
minimum number of months indicated by the guidelines.6 3 These
prisoners must be released before the guidelines range even begins.
Although some may be technically eligible for parole,64 these prisoners are nevertheless routinely denied parole.6 5 An additional half of
the prisoners to whom the guidelines do not apply are not eligible for
parole until after the guidelines range has expired. These prisoners
are not legally eligible until after the range predicted by the guidelines range has expired.6 6 The system lacks precision and equity because of its limited applicability to many federal prisoners.6 7
Flaxman, supra note 9, at 276. Similarly, the offense severity rating "implements a 'just
deserts' policy: Persons who commit the same offense are treated the same way, regardless of
individual differences which would justify disparate treatment." Id
To combat the inherent rigidity in the parole system, the decisionmaking process must
begin to distinguish between two types of prisoners to be processed. One type of prisoner
represents the "usual" case - a crime barren of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and no
indication that special attention should be accorded the offender's personal status. The other
type of prisoner represents the "unusual" case, in which facts or circumstances that mitigate
(or aggravate) the severity of the crime, or facts or circumstances concerning the offender's
personal history deserve individual cosideration. For the "usual" case, the guidelines function
properly and consistency is appropriate. For the "unusual" case, however, the guidelines are
not appropriate. The system needs a built-in method of distinguishing between the "usual"
and the "unusual" cases.
61. See note 60 supra.
62. Flaxman, upra note 9, at 273 (citations omitted). Eg., Butson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 457 F. Supp. 841 (D. Colo. 1978).
63. Id
64. For example, a prisoner sentenced under § 4205(b)(2) [hereinafter referred to as a
"(b)(2) prisoner"] is immediately eligible for parole at the Commission's discretion. See note 3
supra. If the prisoner's maximum sentence is shorter than the minimum period indicated by
the guidelines, the Commission may release him irrespective of the guidelines under § 4206(c).
See note 59 supra. Prisoners in this situation will also be referred to as "unusual" cases, because the guidelines do not work for them either.
65. Flaxman, supra note 9, at 267 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the infrequent
grant of release irrespective of the guidelines, see note 59 supra. See Rodriguez v. United
States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1979).
66. See note 65 supra. Returning to the X- Y example set forth in notes 28, 37, 46, both X
and Y have salient factor scores of 10 and offense severity ratings of "very high" for armed
robbery. The guidelines indicate a range of 24 to 36 months. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1976)
the judge may impose up to 20 years imprisonment for this crime. If Y is sentenced to a
minimum of 4 years and a maximum of 15, the guidelines range is inapplicable.
67. The guidelines were developed to enhance consistency in parole decisionmaking.
See note 6 and accompanying text supra. In fiscal year 1977, 79.9% of parole decisions were
within the guidelines range. See note 59 supra. This figure is deceptive because it does not
reflect that such a large percentage of prisoners (about 50%) are excluded from the guidelines
solely because of the length of their sentences. As discussed in note 60 supra, the guidelines
infuse a desirable amount of consistency in parole decisionmaking in "usual" cases. But in
many "unusual" cases, including those when the prisoner's sentence is of such length to exclude him from the guidelines, the parole system fails. It is unjust to deny parole to prisoners
with short sentences strictly because the guidelines predict a minimum period in prison longer
than the maximum sentence. But more importantly for society, such routine denial of release
may extend incarceration longer than necessary, causing expense to the taxpayers and possible
bitterness on the part of the inmate. See notes 132-139 and accompanying text infra.

If the guidelines were truly applied consistently, predictability
of time to be served would result.6 8 But this consequence has not
occurred: "Although predictability is one of the oft-asserted advantages of the guidelines, in practice the outcome has not been nearly
so certain . . .the guidelines' predictability is illusory."69 Several
reasons could explain this failure. First, there are numerous criteria
"other than those indicated by the guidelines" 7 that ultimately become factors in the parole release decision. For example, the Commission is free to consider dismissed charges, pending charges or any
other type of information concerning the inmate.7 At the same
time, however, the Commission may disregard any information it
considers irrelevant.7 2 The Commission is even free to disregard its
own guidelines.7 3 Since the Commission establishes what is "good
cause" for disregard of the guidelines on an ad hoc basis, there is no
feasible method to predict whether "good cause" will be found.
Lacking stare decisis, an inmate cannot require the Commission to
follow institutional findings of "good cause" to parole him before the
guidelines indicate.7 4 Also, the Commission may continue an inmate's sentence beyond the time suggested by the guidelines as it
pleases, with the sole requirement that the prisoner be "furnished
written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination, including a summary of the information relied upon."7 5
Second, the guidelines are unpredictable because of the ease
with which they can be manipulated. In a study conducted in 1974,
109 initial parole hearings under the newly promulgated guidelines
were observed. The researchers reached the following conclusion:
[Tihe Guidelines do not completely eliminate opportunities for
unstructured discretionary judgments by hearing examiners ...
Classification on the Guideline scales can sometimes also be a way
of shielding a decision that would otherwise require additional
justification as a decision outside the Guidelines. Examiners can
68. Consistent application of the guidelines would form ascertainable patterns. Applied
to similar factual situations, these patterns would yield predictable results.
69. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Musto v.
United States, 571 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1978); Kent v. Warden, 563 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1977); Kills
Crow v. United States, 555 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372
(1st Cir. 1976); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
70. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937, 944 (8th Cir. 1978). See Project, supra note
10, at 837-39.
71. See note 41 supra. See also United States v. Snooks, No. 79-00109-01-CR-W-I
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1976) requires the Commission to consider certain criteria if
"available and relevant." By deciding some evidence or information is either unavailable or
irrelevant, the Commission can justify disregarding it.
73. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
74. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) (1976). Congress requires the Commission to state its reasons for
continuation of the prisoner beyond the time suggested by the guidelines but provides no guidance for what those reasons should be. This notice satisfies the requirements of due process
in parole proceedings. *See note 123 infra.

use the seeming objectivity of the Guidelines as a way of hiding
the exercise of discretion. Occasionally, examiners modify the Salient Factor Score to achieve a desired result ....
More commonly, Offense Severity Ratings rather than Salient
Factor Scores 7are
6 manipulated to avoid explicit decisions outside
the guidelines.
The procedural framework with which the Commission oper-

ates provides further opportunity for abuse. The Commission conducts its hearings behind closed doors.7 7 Although the Commission

must maintain full records of the hearings it conducts,7" it can easily
disregard information it finds "unavailable" or "irrelevant." 7 9 Decisions are rendered with minimal procedural safeguards, 8 0 and they

are generally unreviewable by the courts."'
D.

The Guidelines and The "(b)(2) Prisoner"

While the Commission exhibits some degree of concern for individual treatment of prisoners in parole decisionmaking, blind application of the guidelines must be condemned. The most
objectionable denial of individual consideration is the treatment accorded prisoners sentenced under section 4205(b)(2) of the PCRA.8 2
This provision provides that a sentencing judge may choose to permit the Commission to release the prisoner on parole at such time as
it may determine. 83 No minimum term is fixed by the judge.
The government has admitted, however, that the Commission
applies the same criteria to prisoners sentenced under section (b)(2)
as it applies in other types of sentences when making release deci-5
sions.8 4 This position has been approved by the Second Circuit,
but rejected by most other courts.8 6 To complicate matters further,
76. Project, supra note 7, at 839-39. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
77. Under 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(e) (1980), "[hlearings shall be closed to the public."
78. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(0 (1980). Although hearing examiners must maintain full records,
they have plenary power to limit the information introduced at the hearing. Section 2.13(b).
The examiner may limit or exclude any "irrelevant or repetitious" statements.
79. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
80. See note 123 and accompanying text infra.
81. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976). See note 3 supra.
83. Id
84. United States v. Snooks, No. 79-00109-01-CR-W-I (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980) (stipulation for evidentiary hearing). See also note 3 supra.
85. Moore v. Nelson, 611 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1979). The court found no reason to believe
Congress intended the (b)(2) sentence to receive special consideration. The court exercised
judicial restraint in relegating any changes to be made to "administrative reform or Congressional action." Id at 439 (citations omitted).
86. See, e.g., Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusal to consider suggestions of (b)(2) sentence and staff recommentations is blind abrogation of duties and rights
vested in Commission); United States v. Lacy, 586 F.2d 1258 (8th Cir. 1978) (mechanistic
application of guidelines to (b)(2) prisoner thwarts congressional intent to have judge have
some impact on timing for release); Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238
(3d Cir. 1978), remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980) (remanded to district court for recertification
of class) (legislative history of PCRA indicates sentence was to be a "relevant factor" in parole

when the Supreme Court recently ruled on a related question, it did
not address the issue of the treatment to be accorded a (b)(2) sentence.8 7
The "(b)(2) sentence" possesses the potential for solving a

number of problems in the federal parole system. A judge, having
fully familiarized himself with a defendant, can utilize a "(b)(2) sentence" to signify his finding that this particular offender may be capable of rehabilitation. The "(b)(2) sentence" should alert the
Commission that increased individual consideration is warranted.

Thus, by judicious utilization of the "(b)(2) sentence," the Commission could systematically differentiate prisoners that merit highly individualized consideration from those who do not.8 8 Furthermore, if
the Commission were to accord the "(b)(2) sentence" special or different treatment, cooperation between the judiciary and the Commission would be enhanced. This would help minimize power
struggles for ultimate authority over the time served by the inmate89
and would also minimize the imposition of effective sentences not
intended by the sentencing judges.9"
III.
.4.

Judicial Review of Parole Decisionmaking
The Present Lack of JudicialReview

One of the most notable features of the federal parole system is
the "virtual unreviewability" of the Commission's decisions. 9' Until
release decisionmaking); Kirby v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 703 (D. Minn. 1979) (Commission required to consider good institutional behavior for (b)(2) prisoner).
87. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979). The Supreme Court ruled that frustration of the sentencing judge's subjective intent in imposing a particular sentence is not
grounds for collateral attack of the sentence. Relying upon principles of finality, the Court
held that the Commission's discretion in the release decision was not to be subordinated to
judicial modification of the sentence. The issue whether a "(b)(2) prisoner" deserves distinguishable treatment under the PCRA was not discussed, nor was the general validity of the
guidelines. The Court explicitly stated that "the sentencing judge has no enforcible expectations with respect to the actual release of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term."
Id at 187..
88. The "(b)(2) sentence" would be an appropriate method of signifying an "unusual"
case. See note 60 rupra. The very existence of the (b)(2) option demonstrates Congress intended that some special significance should attach to the (b)(2) sentence. If the Commission is
"alerted" that it has before it an "unusual" case, it could expand upon the criteria considered.
First, the salient factor score has only one positive "Item" to be considered. See notes 36 and
37 and accompanying text supra. If a separate, but similar, scoring system were used to take
better account of positive factors (such as: small children to support, good reputation in the
community, and good institutional performance), the (b)(2) prisoner would be afforded a better chance for individual consideration. If his offense severity rating provided for consideration of factors in mitigation of the crime, the purposes of the (b)(2) sentence would be
furthered and the "unusual" case would be better considered.
89. See 113-115 and accompanying text infra.
90. Sentencing judges very often misapprehend the actual effects the guidelines will have
on the sentence imposed. See note 168 and accompanying text infra.
91. The process of administrative appeals is delineated in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.25, 2.26 (1980).
Within twenty-one days of the initial hearing before two examiners, the inmates receive written notification from the Regional Commissioner. The Commissioner will either concur with
or reject the examiners' recommendation. The prisoner then has thirty days to appeal this

very recently, the courts have not given substantial consideration to
any constitutional challenge to the federal parole system.92 Many
prisoners have presented reasonable
grievances, 93 but all challenges
94
have been rejected by the courts.
The grant of such broad discretion to the Commission poses
several difficult questions regarding the separation of powers and the
exercise of overlapping functions of the courts and the Commission
in the criminal justice system.9 5 At issue is the propriety of relegating sensitive decisions concerning the liberty of inmates to the discretion of an independent and unaccountable agency.9 6 Although
legitimate reasons exist for minimizing judicial supervision of parole
decisionmaking,9 7 such as overcrowded dockets and independent executive participation in the criminal justice system, 9 8 increased judicial review is necessary. Increased access to judicial review can only
be guaranteed by revising and expanding the statutory procedures
for judicial review of parole decisionmaking. 99
decision to the Regional Commissioner, who then has thirty days to respond. If the prisoner is
still dissatisfied, he has thirty days after the entry of the Regional Commissioner's decision in
which to file an appeal with the National Appeals Board. The Board then has sixty days in
which to decide. Its decisions are final. Thus, once statutory parole eligibility and occasional
procedural requirements have been met, the Commission is free to make whatever decision it
wishes with full knowledge that the courts are unlikely to intervene. See R. DAWSON, SENTENCING - THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE, 261 (1969).

92. The first case to question the validity of the guidelines on a constitutional basis is still
not finally resolved. In Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1978), the circuit court discussed the merits of the case at length even though the issue was not
properly before the court, (the class was not properly certified to allow the case to proceed).
The circuit court said that if the guidelines operate in the manner alleged by the named plaintiff, serious questions of unauthorized encroachment upon the judicial and legislative branches
were present, although the district court had granted summary judgment for the government.
The circuit court reversed and remanded for further development of the facts and the substantive claims !f the class (for purposes of the class action suit) could be properly certified. The
Supreme Court heard the case on certiorari at this juncture. 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980). The Court
remanded the case back to the Middle District of Pennsylvania to determine whether the class
action could properly be maintained and, if so, to fully develop the factual issues.
93. See, e.g., Priore v. Nelson, No. 79-2073 (2d Cir. June 11, 1980); United States v.
Miller, 599 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1979); Kirby v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 73 (D. Minn. 1978);
Smaldone v. United States, 458 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kan. 1978).
94. Each of the cases in note 93 supra involved unsuccessful attempts to question the
validity of the guidelines. The courts typically base their decisions on broad interpretations of
the PCRA and deliberately avoid constitutional issues. In some cases, however, courts have
adopted less conventional grounds in dismissing constitutional challenges to the guidelines.
See Ruip v. United States, 555 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1977) (inmate's claim that promulgation of
guidelines subsequent to imposition of sentence that lengthened his time to be served did not
violate the ex post factor clause because the guidelines are only administrative guideposts, not
laws). But see Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir. 1979)
(what Congress cannot do directly, it cannot do by delegation). Accord, Smaldone v. United
States, 458 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (D. Kan. 1978) (since guidelines are only "administrative regulations," they are not subject to the traditional "void for vagueness" strictures).
95. See generally R. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 254 (3d ed. 1972). See note 122
and accompanying text infra.
96. See notes 104, 105, 128 and accompanying text infra.
97. See notes 138-142 and accompanying text infra.
98. Id
99. See notes 143-184 and accompanying text infra.

B.

The Sentencing Judge v. The Commission
In the federal system a sentencing judge is charged with the

complex and difficult task of imposing an appropriate sentence. The
sentence must fit both the offense and the offender.' 0 A basic tenet
under our constitutional system is that the judiciary has the right to
conduct criminal trials and impose sentences upon conviction.' 0 '
The sentencing judge maintains the power to fix sentences. 0 2 This
power to impose sentences has two distinct functions. First, the

judge establishes the maximum period of incarceration, which cannot be extended absent additional infractions by the inmate. Second, the judge establishes the point at which the inmate will become
eligible for parole consideration by selecting the appropriate sentence under section 4205 of the PCRA. 11 3 Congress has, however,
committed the actual release decision, with certain limitations, to the
discretion of the Commission."°
If it is the sentencing judge's responsibility to determine the optimal time for parole eligibility, the Commission should respect and
complement that function in the establishment and implementation
100.

Roberts v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 1362 (1980). See H. KERPER, INTRODUC453 (1972).
101. Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916).
102. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937, 945 (8th Cir. 1978). Although it seems axiomatic that the judge retains his sentencing power, in effect, the Commission's exercise of discretion sometimes works to "produce a sentence far different from that contemplated by the
judge." Id at 944. Courts have expressed various opinions whether the Commission is in
effect "resentencing" a prisoner by routinely denying that prisoner parole release. In Butson v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 457 F. Supp. 841 (D. Colo. 1978), the prisoner had a maximum
sentence shorter than the minimum period suggested by the guidelines. He was denied parole
on this basis. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text supra. The court rejected the petitioner's
allegation that the guidelines were arbitrary and capricious in his case: "The guidelines affect
only the prisoner's chances for parole and have no impact upon the length of the two year
sentence imposed." Id at 845. Although technically correct, the inmate was not sentenced to
two years imprisonment, but to two years as a maximum, with meaningful parole consideration
to occur after serving one-third of the two year term. Such routine denial of parole suggests a
lack of meaningful consideration for release.
The decision to continue a prisoner to expiration made at the one-third point seems to
deny meaningful parole consideration to the eligible prisoner. Id at 842; Reyes-Aquirre v.
Elsea, No. 78C-3283 (N.D. Il. June 13, 1979); United States v. Wigoda, 417 F. Supp. 276
(N.D. 111.1976).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976); Wilson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 460 F. Supp. 73, 78
(D. Minn. 1978). See notes 3, 82-90 and accompanying text supra.
104. The Supreme Court recently held: "Whether wisely or not, Congress has decided
that the Commission is in the best position to determine when release is appropriate." United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1979). The Commission is in the best position to
make the release decision as long as good institutional adjustment is a consideration. Judges
would have no way of projecting the inmate's institutional conduct.
When, however, the Commission disregards institutional adjustment and staff recommendations for parole, see note 59 supra, the Commission then considers the very factors considered by the judge in imposing the sentence:
To the extent that the Parole Commission makes individual judgments about the
relative culpability of prisoners and the length of imprisonment proper to vindicate
the needs of society yet fails to take account of the sentence imposed by the court, the
Commission embarks, alone, on a task which is the traditional province of the judiciary.
TION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

of its policies.' 5 The judge's sentencing function, however, is negated by the Commission's routine denial of parole to prisoners with
sentences shorter than the time suggested by the guidelines.' °1 In
this regard, the Commission's actions are inconsistent with the role
traditionally assigned the sentencing judge. For example, if two
prisoners are guilty of the same crime and sentenced by the same
judge, the sentences will not necessarily be the same. If the judge
sentences one prisoner to three years and the other to nine years, the

judge has reached a deliberate determination that in the former case,
parole eligibility should arise after one year, and in the latter after
three years.107 If the guideline's range for both is forty-six to fiftyfour months, the judge's explicit choice to differentiate between the
two prisoners has been negated. 0 8 Such a result is well within the
scope of the Commission's authority at present, 0 9 even though the
effect is to contravene the determination of the sentencing judge." ,0
The significance the Commission attaches tojudicialpurposesin
imposing a particular sentence is, at best, negligible. As held in
UnitedStates v. Addonizio, judicial purposes are difficult to ascertain,
Nevertheless, the refusal to take acand generally, unrecorded.'
count of the sentence imposed only exacerbates the Commission's
105. The sentencing judge's determinations should be enforced, at least in the "unusual"
cases. See notes 60, 88 and accompanying text supra. First, the sentence imposed by the judge
is subject to subsequent review by courts of appeals. If the judge has transgressed the bounds
of his authority, an appeal would provide relief, or perhaps collateral attack of the sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). See notes 161-173 and accompanying text infra. The Commission's decisions to deny parole, however, are generally final. See note 91 and accompanying
text supra. Second, judicial determinations are rendered by an independent branch, not subject
to political pressures. The employees of the Commission, however, are political appointees of
the executive branch and more likely susceptible to outside influence in reaching a particular
decision. Last, courts are guided by stare decisis. Any deviation from established patterns of
decision can be corrected on subsequent review. The Commission's decisionmaking, however,
is not replete with this protection. Its decisions are made on an ad hoc basis in many instances.
No established norm exists by which to measure the validity of decisions reached. See note
130 infra.
106. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
107. Under § 4205(a) (1976), the statutory minimum sentence is generally one-third of the
maximum. If the judge does not choose a lesser minimum (§ 4205(b)(1)), or an indeterminate
sentence (§ 4205 (b)(2)), the judge imposes this one-third minimum.
108. This effect on the judge's sentence is better understood in the context of the Commission's procedure. The Commission conducts an initial hearing for each prisoner within 120
days of his arrival at the institution to which he is confined. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1980). At this
hearing, a "presumptive release date" is given the prisoner pursuant to the guidelines. 28
C.F.R. § 2.12(b) (1980). If this initial hearing results in a decision to continue the prisoner
with a three year term to expiration of his sentence, the judge's decision is effectively negated.
The prisoner would have to have another hearing after eighteen months, § 2.14(a)(i)(i), but
not at the one year point. This negates the judge's decision, even though the prisoner is in fact
technically eligible for parole.
109. See note 87 supra.
110. Butson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 457 F. Supp. 841 (D. Colo. 1978). Seegenerally Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This contravention of the
decision of the sentencing judge results in "a mockery and often a nullity of the sentencing
process," since unknown judicial purposes may be frustrated and ignored. Project, supra note
7, at 893.
111. 442 U.S. 178 (1979).

failure to properly deal with the "unusual" case. The Commission's
guidelines are not conducive to acceptable treatment of unusual
cases. 1 2 In these instances, the judicial determination of special
need, as indicated by a (b)(2) sentence, should be a factor in the decisionmaking process. By judicious utilization of the (b)(2) sentence,
the Commission could take advantage of the judge's determination
rather that thwarting it. I 3 By refusing to consider the sentence imposed, the Commission only widens the gap between the judiciary
and the Commission.
In the escalating battle for ultimate authority over the term of
imprisonment to be served by the inmate,"I4 the judiciary is rapidly
losing ground. Many sentencing judges are increasing their attempts
to fashion sentences that will achieve theirpurposes when acted upon
by the guidelines. Since the guidelines are unpredictable, many
judges are unable to beneficially adapt to the Commission's procedures. The ever-increasing gap creates a pervading tension between
the two authorities.' 5
The deleterious effects of this power struggle detract from the
interests of justice and administrative efficiency. Inmates are the ultimate victims of this struggle. For example, in one case, a district
judge felt "he had a responsibility to correct a sentence which was
6
imposed under a misapprehension as to [its] potential impact."'
Had the judge been more aware of the application of the guidelines,
he would have imposed "an entirely different sentence."' ' 7 In reversing the district judge's exercise of jurisdiction to modify the sentence, the circuit court stated: "Although this rule may not yield entirely satisfactory results in this case and although we sympathize
with the district court's desire to correct its error, we think our holding today is necessary to preserve the separate functions of the Pa'
role Commission and the sentencing judge." Is
112. See) notes 59, 60 and accompanying lexi supra. See also Geraghty v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978).
113. See notes 82-90 and accompanying text supra. The advantage accruing to the Commission would be supplemental assistance from the judiciary in initially distinguishing the
"unusual" from the "usual" cases. See notes 60, 88 and accompanying text supra.
114. Judicial attempts to circumscribe perceived injustices resulting from the Commission's decisionmaking are numerous. The attempts made by trial judges are generally unsuccessful on appeal. See, e.g., Shahid v. Crawford, 599 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversal of
district court's grant of habeas corpus relief); Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136 (3d Cir.
1978) (no grounds for collateral modification of sentence); Kent v. Warden, 563 F.2d 239 (5th
Cir. 1977) (no grounds for collateral modification of sentence); Kills Crow v. United States,
555 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1977) (no grounds for collateral modification of sentence).
115. Eg. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1978); Banks v. United States,
553 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1977); Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Project, supra note 7, at 885-86.
116. United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372, 373 (Ist Cir. 1976).
117.

Id

118. Id at 376. Although the separation of functions is an important goal, it is not proper
to attach the status of finality to a sentence grounded upon a basic misapprehension. The

When courts are unwilling or unable to give an inmate anything
more than its sympathies, the system lacks an essential element: cooperation between the two authorities. Either the courts must take
into account the operation of the guidelines," 19 or the 12Commission
0
must consider the significance of judicial prerogatives.
The frustration felt by sentencing judges is not without reason,

given the way in which the Commission's decisionmaking circumscribes the judges authority in some cases. 12' A survey of sixty-four
federal judges (shortly after the implementation of the guidelines)
"strongly supports the conclusion that the [Parole] Board's Guidelines impede judicial sentencing purposes and ignore judge's' 22expectations about the relations between sentencing and parole."'
C

Needfor JudicialReview

Although the judiciary has the duty of imposing appropriate
sentences, the courts have "abdicated their concomitant obligation to
ensure equality of treatment in the post-conviction process. "123
Courts have generally been reluctant to exercise their traditional role
judge has not had the opportunity toproperly perform his function if the sentence he imposes
is based on erroneous information.
119. With the current state of overcrowded federal dockets, it is questionable on purely
pragmatic grounds whether judges should be expected to concern themselves with the complexities of the guidelines: "Court personnel become hardened and unfeeling. The role of
judges of [lower] courts seems not to be to dispense justice, but to pass as many people rapidly
through the judicial mill as possible." H. KERPER, supra note 100, at 452.
120. The better approach would be to subordinate the Commission's exercise of discretion
to judicial review on a limited basis to deal with "unusual" cases. See notes 60, 82-90 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 131 and accompanying text infra.
121. See notes 111-115 and accompanying text supra.
122. Project, supra note 7, at 894. The tenor of recent cases discussing the balance between the sentencing judge and the Commission indicates amplified tension and increasing
distance between the two authorities. See notes I I 1-115 and accompanying text supra.
123. Project, supra note 7, at 897. The nature and extent of "fairness" owing to prisoners
at initial parole hearings is very limited. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the
Supreme Court held that a parolee's interest in retaining his freedom at a revocation hearing is
entitled to more due process protection than a prospective parolee's interest in obtaining freedom at his initial hearing. Id at 481-82. A subsequent circuit court opinion analogized the
interests of a parolee and a prospective parolee. Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511
F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court found the prisoner had a protectible interest in
obtaining conditional liberty, and required three minimal safeguards in hearings: a statement
of reasons for denying parole; access to information relied upon; and the right to be heard in
the proceedings. See also King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974); United States
ex rel v. Harrison v. Pace, 357 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Supreme Court held that prisoners do not
lose their constitutional rights upon confinement. The court found a right to protection from
the arbitrary abrogation of a state created right.
The Supreme Court has recently retreated from its liberal views in Morrissey and Wol'in
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. I (1979). In
Greenholtz, the court ruled, in contravention of Childs, 511 F.2d 1270, that "[tihere is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. . . . [Tihe conviction, with all of its procedural safeguards, has
extinguished [the] liberty right." Id at 6. Moreover, the Court held:
Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not automatically invoke due process protection; there is simply no constitutional guarantee that
all executive decisionmaking must comply with standards that assure error-free de-

of leadership in working out minimal standards of fairness with regard to administrative decisionmaking:' 2 4 "[W]hat the law of reviewability most needs is a greater judicial willingness to inquire
whether administrative discretion has been abused in some specialized areas."' 2 5 Courts must be ready, willing and able to ensure that
the Parole Commission exercises its discretion in compliance with
the dictates of the federal constitution, the PCRA, its own rules, and
the sentencing judge's mandates. 2 6 Several compelling reasons suggest that any administrative action should be subject to at least limited judicial review.' 27 First, limited judicial review will strengthen,
not weaken, the administrative process. By compelling the agency to
follow its own policies, the courts infuse consistency and fairness
into an otherwise unaccountable administrative system.' 28 Second,
complete disregard of the capacity of the judiciary for achieving fair
results violates the cardinal principle that functions should be allocated to the branch best able to achieve those results. The Commis29
sion is incapable of completely independent decisionmaking.
Finally, an independent check of the Commission's discretion is necessary for the same reasons a court of appeals checks a trial court. In
the absence of any subsequent, independent check of the Commis30
sion's discretion, parole decisions, whether fair or not, are final.'
terminations. [citations omitted]. This is especially true with respect to the sensitive
choices presented by the administrative decision to grant parole release.
Id at 7. The court reestablished a higher degree of due process protection for a parolee, as
opposed to a prospective parolee. In a release proceeding, due process does not even require a
statement of the facts relied upon if parole is denied. Id. at 6. Under Greenholtz, the only due
process requirements in parole release proceedings are: the prisoner must have an opportunity
to be heard and, if parole is denied, notice given why he did not qualify for parole.
124. K. DAVIS, supra note 95, at 254.
125. Id at 524.
126. United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 1978). Accord, Geraghty v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 579 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1978). Cf.United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (Congress cannot delegate or restrict the judiciary's responsibility to be the ultimate arbiter of personal rights).
127. K. DAVIS, supra note 95, at 524.
128. The Commission would be forced to ensure fairness and regularity in its procedures
if its decisions were subject to limited judicial review. This would strengthen the system by
minimizing complaints lodged against it for being totally independent. Deference to judicial
prerogatives promotes disrespect for the entire system on the part of the inmate and tension
between the Commission and the judiciary. A limited increase in judicial review could minimize disrespect and tension.
129. Judges, not hearing examiners or Commissioners, are specialists in constitutional issues, in statutory interpretation, and in ensuring fair procedures. The traditional safeguards in
judicial proceedings are absent in parole decisionmaking proceedings. See note 105 and accompanying text supra.
130. Because of the judiciary's political independence, there is less of a concern that a
sentence will result from political pressure. The Commission is a political entity and is arguably not immune to coercion. This is one reason why judicial sentences deserve more "finality"
than the Commission's denials of parole. Also, a judge's sentence is generally accorded deference upon review mainly because the record is barren of the judge's subjective intuitions concerning the particular prisoner involved. Restructuring the parole release decision on review
would not present this problem to the same degree because records must be kept of the proceedings. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(0 (1980). Judges function as experts in determining justice; hearing
examiners and Commissioners do not.

Judicial review of parole decisions on a limited basis' 3' would
serve a number of additional purposes. First, an aggrieved prisoner
would not feel excluded from the criminal justice system if he has
recourse to the courts. This recourse would minimize bitterness or
disrespect for the system on the part of an inmate who will eventually be released. Disrespect for the system will only further alienate
the prisoner. 32 Second, limited judicial review would promote cooperation, or at least mutual recognition, between the judiciary and
the Commission. 31 3 Third, in resolving important issues of criminal
34
law the courts provide a forum that is accessible to public scrutiny.
Parole hearings, on the other hand, are closed to the public,' 35 and
the procedures are subject to little if any critical analysis.' 3 6 Finally,
limited judicial review, triggered by utilization of the (b)(2) sentence,
would help resolve the problems the present system has in dealing
with "unusual" cases. The (b)(2) sentence would provide for a managed and controlled judicial review of parole decisionmaking for
those cases meriting the special attention that is currently unavailable under application of the guidelines.' 37 Providing for better accommodation of the "unusual" cases will further the goals of the
guidelines and remove some of the imprecision and inequity inherent in the system.
Equally important policies exist, however, for minimizing any
judicial review of parole decisions. First, courts are concerned with
the potential of an overwhelming number of cases from disgruntled
prisoners.' 38 Notwithstanding this legitimate concern, the courts
must vindicate the needs of society and the privileges accruing to the
prisoners.' 39 Second, the doctrine of separation of powers 140 would
13 1. Judges could limit the cases that would qualify for extended review by sentencing
only those prisoners under § 4205(b)(2) they feel merit such attention. If this section triggered
a provision for judicial review of release decisions, the judges would sua sponle use the sentence sparingly to limit their potential caseloads from such a provision.
132. In United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937, 947 (8th Cir. 1978), the court noted society's interests in minimizing the inmate's feeling of hostility and bitterness, both while in
prison and upon release.
133. See notes 113-122 and accompanying text supra.
134. Project, supra note 7, at 895. The researchers determined:
Society's oals, be they instrumental goals of general deterrence or moral goals of
denunciation or condemnation, can better be served in the more visible judicial forum. No matter how well publicized Board procedures become, no matter how much
light and air come into the parole process, the courtroom is the focal point for the
resolution of conflicts in the criminal law.
Id.
135. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(e) (1980).
136. A study conducted of 109 actual parole hearings demonstrates a lack of fairness and
minimal due process. Project, supra note 7, at 833-38. Extensive empirical analysis might
fortify the findings of this study at the present time. See United States v. Snooks, No. 79-00901-CR-W-i (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980).
137. See notes 60, 82-90, 131 and accompanying text supra.
138. See, e.g., Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v.
DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372 (Ist Cir. 1976). For a discussion of how this potential for floodgates
litigation could be minimized, see note 131 supra.
139. Society suffers a loss when a prisoner, who might be qualified for parole, is denied

seem to place limits on judicial review of parole decisions. Such review would represent an encroachment of the judiciary on the Commission's power to make the actual release decision, a power
specifically delegated by Congress. Increased judicial review, however, would not encroach upon the Commission's function. Instead,
judicial review would clearly delineate the parameters of authority
for each governmental body. The judiciary must restrain the Commission from resentencing the inmate which would represent an encroachment of authority of the judiciary. 4 '
Neither the added number of cases nor the relegation of the release decision to the Commission should compel the judiciary to abdicate part of its integral function. If the prisoner has been denied
meaningful
parole consideration, the judiciary must provide re14 2
lief.
IV.

Inadequacy of Statutory Access to Judicial Forums

Under current statutory provisions, the courts generally hold
that "[u]nless the parole commission's [sic] actions violate the applicable statutes, result in constitutional infractions, or are patently arbitrary and capricious, the merits of the actions are not reviewable
by the courts."' 14 3 "Virtual unreviewability"''

44

of parole decision-

making has resulted, however, because inmates possess insufficient
access to courts with requisite personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.' 45 Even prisoners with genuine grievances concerning Commission procedures have been denied relief by federal courts that are
46
unable or unwilling to entertain jurisdiction. 1
Jurisdictional problems, as well as other obstacles to judicial review, are present in each of the three statutory provisions most often
invoked by federal prisoners seeking judicial review over parole decisions.
meaningful parole consideration. The added cost to the taxpayers of unnecessary incarceration
is a concern, but it is equally important to avoid creating resentment or disrespect in the inmate. Such feelings may generate further anti-social behavior once the prisoner is released.
These concerns are no less significant than the "floodgates" concern. The prisoner's interest in
ensuring adherence to regular decisionmaking practices becomes no less compelling by virtue
of overcrowded dockets. To deny prisoners access to judicial review is to assign a price to their
valid, personal interests and rights. Society should not be prepared to consider the price too
high.
140. See notes 104, 105 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 110-120 and accompanying text supra.
142. See, e.g., Reyes-Aquirre v. Elsea, No. 78-C-3283 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 1979); United
States v. Wigoda, 417 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
143. Butson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 457 F. Supp. 841, 845 (D. Colo. 1978).
144. See note 91 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 146-184 and accompanying text infra.
146. See Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

A.

Title 28 U.SC. Section 2241 (1976)-The Writ of Habeas
Corpus

A writ of habeas corpus is one available remedy for prisoners
illegally detained by the government.' 4 7 A significant jurisdictional
obstacle, however, frequently faces inmates seeking this remedy. A
federal court, in order to entertain a habeas corpus proceeding, must
have jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian.' 4 8 If, therefore, a
prisoner is ultimately confined in a district other than the one in
which he was sentenced, the sentencing judge is powerless to review
his sentence by writ of habeas corpus. The lack of jurisdictional authority for a sentencing judge to entertain a petition under section
2241 raises a number of problems. 149 First, if a prisoner petitions for
a writ of habeas corpus in a district other than the one in which he
was sentenced, it is unlikely that the judge in that district will be as
familiar with the prisoner's case as the sentencing judge. The sentencing judge is in the better position to determine whether a prisoner in the "unusual" case was in fact given meaningful parole
consideration.15 0 Second, many second judges will automatically defer to the sentencing judge's determinations, resulting in a small
probability for a successful petition. Last, constitutional questions
may be raised by the arbitrary denial of a benefit to those prisoners
not fortunate enough to be incarcerated within the jurisdiction of the
Section 2241, therefore, should be revised to alsentencing court.'
low for concurrent jurisdiction over the custodian by both the district
in which the inmate is incarcerated and the district in which he was
52
sentenced.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See also United States ex tel. Means v. Solem, 457 F. Supp.
1256 (D.S.D. 1980). For a brief history of the expansion of this remedy, see Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 474 (1976).
148. Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1976).
149. Id. at 948.
150. For example, if the Commission failed to consider the requisite criteria under section
4207 of the PCRA, or arrived at a determination wholly based upon inaccurate or non-existent
"facts," the sentencing judge would have a better capacity for finding flaws. The prisoner has a
right to be heard at the proceeding. See note 123 supra. If the prisoner alleges that right was
constructively denied because everything he said was excluded or simply ignored, the sentencing judge would be more capable to weigh the validity of the allegations. See United States v.
Snooks, No. 79-00109-01-CR-W-I (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980).
151. The benefit denied to these prisoners is the benefit described in note 150 and accompanying text supra. Section 2241 relief should not be more effective in one case than another
solely because of the prisoners' location. A prisoner should not, arguendo, be foreclosed from
access to the judge most familiar with his case for the sole reason that he is incarcerated in a
different district. There has been no hearing or notice to justify such an abrogation of a governmentally created right.
152. Under subsection (d) of § 2241, a state prisoner in a state with more than one federal
judicial district may transfer his petition to the district in which he was sentenced, if incarcerated elsewhere. The districts have "concurrent" jurisdiction. Currently,federal prisoners do
not enjoy this opportunity. Particularly in the context of "unusual" cases, in which the guidelines fail of their essential purposes, the prisoners should enjoy the same privilege accorded
state prisoners. The sentencing judge could then rectify the failure of the guidelines system by
providing relief available under section 2241. See note 154 and accompanying text infra.

Since decisions by the Parole Commission are subject to review
only by way of a habeas corpus proceeding, 5 3 the adequacy of
habeas corpus review must be ensured. This can be accomplished by
providing for review by the judge most qualified to rule on the merits of the petition-the sentencing judge.
Besides the initial jurisdictional obstacle, the writ of habeas
corpus is further restricted to cases involving an abridgement of the
prisoner's constitutional rights:
The district court, of course, has authority to review a decision by
the Board, where the issue has been properly brought before the
court in a habeas corpus proceeding, which shows an abuse of discretion on the part of the Board, resulting in an abridgement of
the prisoner's constitutional rights. [citations omitted]. The only
remedy which the court can give is to order the Board to correct
the absues or wrongful conduct within a fixed period of time, after
which, in the case of non-compliance, the court can grant the writ
of habeas
corpus and order the prisoner discharged from cus54
tody.1
This remedy, however, is of very limited utility to prospective
parolees in light of the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex 55 that a prospective parolee has only two rights protected by
due process in the decisionmaking procedure. First, the prisoner has
a right to be heard at the proceeding; and second, if he is denied
parole, the parole authority must notify him why he did not qualify
for parole.' 56 No additional requirement exists that the inmate be
advised of the information relied upon by the Commission in reaching its decision.' 5 7 The Greenholtz ,court retreated from an earlier,
more liberal view"' in holding that the prisoner's conviction, "with
' 59
all its procedural safeguards, has extinguished the liberty right."'
With only two basic constitutional requirements, the abridgement of
a constitutionalright to invoke habeas corpus relief is not likely. The
Commission may comply with the two requirements under Greenholtz and still decide unjustly." 6°
153. Duldulao v. United'States Parole-Comm'n, 461 F. Supp. 1138, 1140 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
154. Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976).
The general rule is that federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless it appears
that the prisoner is in custody in violation of the federal constitution. Thomas v. Eyman, 235
F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1965), afl'd sub nom., Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, rehearing denied,
357 U.S. 944 (1958).
155. 442 U.S. 1 (1979). See note 123 supra.
156. 442 U.S. at 4.
157. Id at 6.
158. See note 123 supra.
159. 442 U.S. at 5.
160. The requirements under Greenholiz are minimal. Because there is no guarantee
under the federal constitution that all executive decisionmakers apply safeguards to assure
error-free determinations, errors result. But see United States v. Snooks, No. 79-00109-01-CRW-1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980).

B.

Title 28 US.C Section 2255 (1976). CollateralAttack on an
Illegal Sentence

Although section 2255161 theoretically provides an expeditious
alternative to the writ of habeas corpus in correcting erroneous
sentences, 162 it is no longer a viable source of relief for aggrieved
prisoners challenging unwarranted results of parole decisionmaking. 163 The Supreme Court has denied access under section 2255
when the sentencing judge misapprehended the guidelines and seeks
to correct his error by collateral review. 1" Collateral review of
'1 65
sentences is currently available only for "critical error.'
The limited scope of section 2255 is unfortunate. Because the
system cannot equitably handle the unusual" case, the Commission's
decisions should not be given such finality. Similarly, because the
judges may be prone to error when attempting to predict the effect of
the guidelines, the finality applied to sentences is often inequitable.
In addition, when the Commission routinely denies parole to prisoners with sentences shorter than the minimum time suggested by the
guidelines, a judge should be able to effectuate his desire to have the
prisoner receive early meaningful parole consideration, rather than
routine denial. By attaching overriding significance to the doctrine
of finality, 166 courts are required167 to let a sentence stand, even
though it was indisputably predicated upon misapprehension or un161. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). This section provides for collateral attack, at any time, of an
illegal sentence, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, or a sentence "otherwise subject to
collateral attack."
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) (reviser's note).
163. See generally United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979). See also note 87
supra.

164. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the dispute among the circuits concerning the application of § 2255. A number of
circuits allowed review if the sentence was imposed before the guidelines and the guidelines
changed the significance of the sentence. Kent v. Warden, 563 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1977); Kortness v. United States, 514 F.2d 167
(8th Cir. 1975). One circuit expanded this rule and allowed review under § 2255 for any frustration of the judge's sentencing purposes by the guidelines. United States v. McBride, 560
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1977). Other courts rejected either rule and did not allow for such collateral
attack. Wright v. United States Bd. of Parole, 557 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1977); Andrino v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 550 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1977). Addonizio settled the controversy by holding that judges have no enforceable expectations concerning the release of the prisoner short of
the maximum time imposed.
165. The court held that frustration of the subjective intent of the sentencing judge is not
"critical error," thereby conferring jurisdiction under § 2255:
The claimed error here - that the judge was incorrect in his assumptions about the
future course of parole proceedings - does not meet any of the established standards
of collateral attack. . . . [T]he proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or
law of the 'fundamental character' that renders the entire procedure irregular and
invalid.
442 U.S. at 183.
166. The Court held that subsequent actions taken by the Parole Commission do not retroactively affect the legal validity of the final judgment itself. Id at 184.
167. The courts do not have jurisdiction over the subject matter unless there is a "critical
error." See note 165 supra

awareness of the guidelines.'6
The ends of justice and the goal of imposing an appropriatesentence cannot be served unless the sentence is free from basic error. If
an erroneous sentence is allowed to stand, the prisoner did not receive punishment designed to fit his personal traits and offenses. To
achieve individualized sentences, the sentence must fit the individual, as determined by the sentencing judge. Although a misapprehension of how the guidelines apply is not a "fundamental error"
which "renders the entire procedure irregular and invalid,"' 69 it is,
nevertheless an error which70 renders the prisoner's sentence inappropriate for that individual.
In imposing a sentence, a judge should be as certain as possible
that the information upon which he is relying is accurate. Under
section 2255, as it is now interpreted, 7 ' if a judge learns after sentencing that the pre-sentence investigation report contained erroneous materials concerning the guidelines, he is powerless to adjust the
sentence accordingly. 7 2 By requiring that there be a "fundamental
error" in order to activate section 2255 jurisdiction, all those errors
found by the court to be less serious are irremediable. For prisoners
whose sentences are based upon a misapprehension, the existence of
a section 2255 remedy becomes illusory. 7 3
C

FederalRule of CriminalProcedure35
Rule 35 provides that a sentencing judge may, in his discretion,

168. See, e.g., Musto v. United States, 571 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1978) (reversed district
judge's collateral modification - misapprehension of guidelines); Kills Crow v. United States,
555 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversed district judge's collateral modification of sentence misapprehension of guidelines); Kent v. Warden, 563 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversed district's collateral reduction of sentence - unaware of guidelines); United States v. DiRusso, 548
F.2d 372 (Ist Cir. 1976) (reversed district judge's collateral modification of sentence - misapprehension of guidelines).
169. See note 165 supra.
170. See Buckkannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
171. See notes 87, 165, 166 and accompanying text supra.
172. The judge in Buckhannon v. Hambrick, 487 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), was powerless to correct what appeared to be a very great injustice, caused both by the erroneous presentence report he considered and the rigidity of the guidelines as applied to this "unusual"
case. None of the three avenues of review were open to him. The inmate was incarcerated in a
different district, so the judge did not have the requisite jurisdiction for habeas corpus relief.
Under the limitations to § 2255 he could not modify his final judgment. And under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35, the 120 day period had passed before the inmate filed the requisite motion. See
notes 174-178 and accompanying text infra.
173. A fairly simple way of increasing accessibility to § 2255 relief on a limited basis,
strictly in the context of parole, would be to employ a "standard of deviation." Specifically, if
the range suggested by the guidelines deviates a specified percentage amount from the approximate time at which the judge mistakenly believed the guidelines would indicate for release,
jurisdiction should arise. In limiting this review to (b)(2) prisoners and those whose sentences
are of such length to render the guidelines useless, the extended authority would not impinge
upon the Commission's functions because the guidelinesfal to function properly in these "unusual" cases. It is in these cases that supplementation is necessary. Supplementation by way
of increased judicial review can only fortify the system.

reduce the sentence imposed on an inmate within 120 days of its
imposition.' 7 4 The sentencing judge loses jurisdiction to rule on a
motion unless the motion is filed by the prisoner within 120 days of
sentencing.
Procedures of the Commission, however, may operate to nullify
the effect of Rule 35 as a check on the Commission's discretion. The
Commission has 120 days after the inmate's arrival at his institution
in which to conduct an initial hearing and set a presumptive release
date. " Although the examiners orally inform the inmate of their
recommendation at the hearing, they have another twenty-one days
in which to provide him with written notice.' 7 6 The Regional Commissioner must accept or reject this recommendation.' 7 7 Thus, a
prisoner has only 120 days in which to file a Rule 35 motion but may
have to wait up to 141 days to receive notice of the Commission's
decision. 7 ' By the time the prisoner receives official, written notice
of the Commission's action on his case, Rule 35 may not be an available remedy.
In United States v. Snooks, "I the question was presented
whether a district court had jurisdiction to rule on a timely filed Rule
35 motion after the expiration of the 120 day period. In this case the
government stipulated it would refuse to give special consideration
to the (b)(2) sentence imposed by the court.'8 0 In the continuing battle for ultimate authority over the inmate, 8 ' the court ruled that it
would defer deciding on the merits of the Rule 35 motion until after
82
the inmate exhausted all his administrative remedies. 1
Rule 35 was designed to allow a judge to change a sentence if he
perceived an error or an injustice in its imposition. In the parole
context, the 120 day period is too short to achieve the purposes of the
rule. The Commission's inequitable treatment of "unusual".
cases183 could work an injustice that will not become known until after the 120 day period has passed. In this sense, the rule is insuffi174. The judge has absolute discretion to reduce a sentence "within 120 days after the
sentence is imposed." This restriction has been interpreted broadly by some courts. See notes
179-182 and accompanying text infra
175. 28 C.F.R. § 2.12(a) (1980).
176. 28 C.F.R. § 2.13(c) (1980).
177. 28 C.F.R. § 2.24(a) (1980).
178. The hearing examiners' recommendation is not an official decision. It is not final
until reviewed by the Commissioner. 28 C.F.R. § 2.24(a) (1980).
179. No. 79-00109-01-CR-W-1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 13, 1980).
180. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
181. See notes 114-122 and accompanying text supra.
182. The court actually reviewed an earlier order that it retain jurisdiction in order to
develop the relevant and factual circumstances affecting the merits of the motion. The government opposed this activity, claiming the 120 day period limited the time in which the court had
jurisdiction to act, not just the time within which the motion had to be filed. The court ruled in
its own favor.
183. See note 60 and accompanying text supra

cient. For "unusual" cases, then, the period should be lengthened.
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V. Conclusion
Although laudable in many respects, the federal parole guidelines lack precision and equity in some instances. The judiciary,
which has traditionally been responsible for assuring fairness and
regularity in governmental actions, has not adequately addressed
these failures. The guidelines do solve some of the problems they
are designed to remedy. The "usual" cases presenting no unique or
mitigating circumstances receive consistent decisionmaking treatment. Some of the arbitrariness in the release decision process has
been reduced by use of the guidelines in these cases. In the "unusual" cases, however, the system fails. Those prisoners that require
more individualized treatment because of mitigating factors do not
receive fair treatment. Applied in these cases, and in cases in which
the prisoners' sentences are short, the guidelines often achieve undesirable results. Such imprecision lends itself to unnecessary incarceration, which in turn fails to properly vindicate the needs of society.
Judicial review of parole decisionmaking is advisable because
the courts are best able to perceive unwarranted actions by the Commission. The courts are equipped with stare decisis, political independence, and expertise in statutory and constitutional
interpretation. The Commission, on the other hand, has unfettered
discretionary power yet lacks the safeguards necessary to ensure fairness in the exercise of its discretion.
Increased judicial review must be brought about by an augmented assertion of judicial authority. More fundamentally, the
statutory avenues to the courts need to be revised.
The (b)(2) sentence would provide a feasible and appropriate
means of providing for extended judicial authority over those prisoners for whom the present system is not adequate. The "usual"
cases do not call for extensive individual consideration. Consistent
application of the guidelines can help diminish capricious decisionmaking in these cases. Sentencing judges use the (b)(2) sentence to
denote those prisoners that merit early parole consideration. By attaching special significance to this judicial determination, the Commission could distinguish among those prisoners who do, and those
who do not, benefit from the application of the guidelines as they
now exist. Alternate criteria should be utilized for (b)(2) prisoners.
184. Use of the (b)(2) sentence to signify an "unusual" case is feasible. Also, those prisoners with maximum sentences shorter than the minimum guideline indicator are "unusual"
cases. These are the prisoners for whom the guidelines do not work. If the 120 period is
extended to such time to allow the judge to see the presumptive release date set by the Commission, he will know whether justice demands the sentence be reduced.

If the Commission fails to give meaningful parole consideration to
these prisoners, the courts should be available to provide relief.
If a judge commits a fundamental error in his apprehension of
how the Commission will treat a defendant he should have a method
by which to correct his error. The criminal justice system should not
permit imprecision and inequity in a process that so profoundly affects the substantial interests of prisoners and the community.
JACK M. SEITZ

APPENDIX I
Revision effective April 1977
SALIENT FACTOR SCORE

Register Number

Name

Item A .................................................. [No prior convictions (adult or juvenile) = 3
One prior conviction = 2
Two or three convictions = 1
Four or more prior convictions = 0
Item B ..................................................
No prior commitments (adult or juvenile) = 2
One or two prior commitments = 1
Three or more prior commitments = 0

El

0
Item C ..................................................
Age at behavior leading to first commitment
(adult or juvenile):
26 or older = 2
18-25 = 1
17 or younger = 0
*Item D ..................................................
Commitment offense did not involve auto theft or check(s)
(forgery/larceny) = 1
Commitment offense involved auto theft [XI, or check(s)
[Y], or both [Z] = 0
*Item E .................................................. INever had parole revoked or been committed for a new
offense while on parole, and not a probation violator this
time = 1
Has had parole revoked or been committed for a new offense while on parole [X], or is a probation violator this
time [Y], or both [Z] = 0
Item F ..................................................
No history of heroin or opiate dependence = 1
Otherwise = 0

-l

D
Item G ..................................................
Verified employment (or full-time school attendance) for a
total of at least 6 months during the last 2 years in the
community = 1
Otherwise = 0
TOTAL SCORE .......................................
NOTE:

E

For purposes of the Salient Factor Score, an instance
of criminal behavior resulting in a judicial determination of guilt or an admission of guilt before a judicial body shall be treated as if a conviction, even if a
conviction is not formaly entered.

*NOTE TO EXAMINERS:
If Item D and/or E is scored 0, place the appropriate letter
(X, Y or Z) on the line to the right of the box.

APPENDIX II
Revision effective June 1979
ADULT*
GUIDELINES FOR DECISION-MAKING
[Guidelines for Decision-Making, Customary Total Time to be Served before Release
(including jail time)]
OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS:
Severity of Offense Behavior
(Examples)

LOW
Alcohol or Cigarette law violations,
including tax evasion (amount of tax
evaded less than $2,000)'
Gambling law violations (no managerial
or proprietary interest)
Illicit drugs, simple possession
Marihuana/hashish, possession with intent
to distribute/sale [very small scale (e.g.,
less than 10 lbs. of marihuana/less than
I lb. of hashish/less than .01 liter of
hash oil)]
Property offenses (theft, income tax evasion, or simple possession of stolen
property) less than $2,000
LOW MODERATE
Counterfeit currency or other medium of
exchange [(passing/possession) less than
$2,0001
Drugs (other than specifically categorized),
possession with intent to distribute/sale
[very small scale (e.g., less than 200
doses)]
Marihuana/hashish, possession with intent
to distribute/sale (small scale (e.g., 10-49
lbs. of marihuana / 1-4.9 lbs of hashish
/ .01-.04 liters of hash oil)]
Cocaine, possession with intent to distribute/sale [very small scale (e.g., less
than I gram of 100% purity, or
equivalent amount)]
Gambling law violations - managerial or
proprietary interest in small scale operation [e.g., Sports books (estimated daily
gross less than $5,000); Horse books
(estimated daily gross less than $1,500);
Numbers bankers (estimated daily gross
less than $750)]
Immigration law violations
Property offenses (forgery/fraud/theft
from mail/embezzlement/interstate
transportation of stolen or forged securities/receiving stolen property with intent
to resell) less than $2,000

OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Parole Prognosis
(Salient Factor Score)
Very Good
(I Ito 9)

Good
(8 to 6)

Fair
(5 to 4)

Poor
(3 to 0)

6
months

6-9
months

9-12
months

12-16
months

8
months

8-12
months

12-16
months

16-22
months

* There is a separate guideline chart for Youth/Nara cases (not shown).

ADULT
Very Good
(II to9)

Good
(8 to 6)

Fair
(5 to 4)

Poor
(3 to 0)

14-18
months

18-24
months

24-32
months

14-18
months

18-24
months

24-32
months

20-26
months

26-34
months

34-44
months

MODERATE
Automobile theft (3 cars or less involved
and total value does not exceed
$19,999)2
Counterfeit currency or other medium of
exchange [passing/possession) $2,000 $19,999]
Drugs (other than specifically categorized),
10-14
possession with intent to distribute/sale
months
[small scale (e.g., 200-999 doses)]
Marihuana/hashish, possession with intent
to distribute/sale [medium sale (e.g., 50199 lbs. of marihuana / 5-19.9 lbs of
hashish / .05-.19 liters of hash oil)]
Cocaine, possession with intent to distribute/sale [small scale (e.g., 1.0-4.9
grams of 100% purity, or equivalent
amount)]
Opiates, possession with intent to distribute/sale [evidence of opiate addiction and very small scale (e.g., less than
1.0 grams of 100% pure heroin, or
equivalent amount)]
Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale
(single weapon; not sawed-off shotgun
or machine gun)
10-14
Gambling law violations - managerial or
months
proprietary interest in medium scale
operation [e.g., Sports books (estimated
daily gross $5,000-$15,000); Horse books
(estimated daily gross $1,500$4,000);
Numbers bankers (estimated daily gross
$750-2000)]
Property offenses
(theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate
transportation of stolen or forged securities/income tax evasion/receiving stolen
property) $2,000-419,999
Smuggling/transporting of alien(s)
HIGH
3

Carnal Knowledge
Counterfeit currency or other medium of
exchange [(passing/possession) $20,000 $100,0001
Counterfeiting [manufacturing (amount of
counterfeit currency or other medium of
exchange involved not exceeding
$100,000)]
Drugs (other than specifically listed), possession with intent to distribute/sale
[medium scale (e.g., 1,000-19,999 doses)]
Marihuana/hashish, possession with intent
to distribute/sale [large scale (e.g., 2001,999 lbs. of marihuana / 20-199 lbs. of
hashish / .20-1.99 liters of hash oil)]
Cocaine, possession with intent to distribute/sale [medium scale (e.g., 5-99
grams of 100% purity, or equivalent
amount)]

14-20
months

ADULT
Very Good
(11 to 9)
Opiates, possession with intent to distribute/sale [small scale (e.g., less than 5
grams of 100% pure heroin, or
equivalent amount) except as described
in moderate]
Firearms Act, possession/purchase/sale
(sawed-off shotgun(s), machine gun(s),
or multiple weapons)
Gambling law violations - managerial or
proprietary interest in large scale operation (e.g., Sports books (estimated daily
gross more than $15,000); Horse books
(estimated daily gross more than
$4,000); Numbers bankers (estimated
daily gross more than $2,000)]
Involuntary manslaughter (e.g., negligent
homicide)
Mann Act (no force - commercial purposes)
Property offenses
(theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate
transporation of stolen or forged securities/income tax evasion/receiving stolen
property) $20,000 - $100,000
Threatening communications (e.g.,
14-20
mail/phone) - not for purposes of extormonths
tion and no other overt act

Good
(8 to 6)

Fair
(5 to 4)

Poor
(3 to 0)

20-26
months

26-34
months

34-44
months

36-48
months

48-60
months

60-72
months

VERY HIGH
Robbery (I or 2 instances)
Breaking and entering - armory with
intent to steal weapons
Breaking and entering/burglary - residence; or breaking and entering of other
premises with hostile confrontation with
victim
Counterfeit currency or other medium of
exchange [(passing/possession) - more
than $100,000 but not exceeding

$500,000]
Drugs (other than specifically listed), possession with intent to distribute/sale
[large scale (e.g., 20,000 or more doses)
except as described in Greatest I]
Marihuana/hashish, possession with intent
to distribute/sale [very large scale (e.g.,
2,000 lbs. or more of marihuana / 200
lbs. or more of hashish / 2 liters or
more of hash oil)]
Cocaine, possession with intent to distribute/sale [large scale (e.g., 100 grams
or more of 100% purity, or equivalent
amount) except as described in Greatest

I]
Opiates, possession with intent to distribute/sale [medium scale or more (e.g.,
5 grams or more of 100% pure heroin,
or equivalent amount) except as
described in Greatest I]
Extortion [threat of physical harm (to
person or property)]

24-36
months

ADULT
Very Good
(I I to 9)

Good
(8 to 6)

Fair
(5 to 4)

Poor
(3 to 0)

40-52
months

52-64
months

64-78
months

78-100
months

40-52
months

52-64
months

64-78
months

78-100
months

52+
months

64+
months

78+
months

100+
months

Explosives, possession/transportation
Property offenses
(theft/forgery/fraud/embezzlement/interstate
transportation of stolen or forged securities/income tax evasion/receiving stolen
property) more than $100,000 but not
exceeding $500,000
GREATEST I
Aggravated felony (e.g., robbery: weapon
fired or injury of a type normally
requiring medical attention)
Arson or explosive detonation [involving
potential risk of physical injury to person(s) (e.g., premises occupied or likely
to be occupied) - no serious injury
occurred]
Drugs (other than specifically listed), possession with intent to distribute/sale
[managerial or proprietary interest and
very large scale (e.g., offense involving
more than 200,000 doses)]
Cocaine, possession with intent to distribute/sale [managerial or proprietary
interest and very large scale (e.g.,
offense involving more than 1 kilogram
of 100% purity, or equivalent amount)]
Opiates, possession with intent to distribute/sale [managerial or proprietary
interest and very large scale (e.g.,
offense involving more than 50 grams of
100% pure heroin, or equivalent
amount)]
Kidnaping [other than listed in Greatest
II; limited duration; and no harm to
victim (e.g., kidnaping the driver of a
truck during a hijacking, driving to a
secluded location, and releasing victim
unharmed)]
Robbery (3 or 4 instances)
Sex act - force (e.g., forcible rape or Mann
Act (force)]
Voluntary manslaughter (unlawful killing
of a human being without malice; sudden quarrel or heat of passion)
GREATEST II
Murder
Aggravated felony - serious injury (e.g.,
robbery: injury involving substantial
risk of death, or protracted disability, or
disfigurement) or extreme cruelty/brutality toward victim
Aircraft hijacking
Espionage
Kidnapping (for ransom or terrorism; as
hostage; or harm to victim)
Treason

Specific upper limits are not provided due
to the limited number of cases and the
extreme variation possible within category.

